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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL IN AFRICAN PEACE
MANAGEMENT: SOME PROPOSALS
A. Peter Mutharika*
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations global peace management scheme is based on
certain fundamental assumptions that require serious reexamination as
we enter the twenty-first century. Fundamental to the 1945 vision of
global peace management was the prevention of a third world war
through collective action by the great powers.' Structurally, this was to
be achieved by a system of great power governance through the mecha-
nism of the Security Council. While the Charter confers on the Security
Council "primary responsibility"' for the maintenance of international
peace and security, executive decisionmaking is reserved for the great
powers through permanent membership and the veto power. The present
economic and military decline of Britain and France, the inability of
Russia to play an effective role in world affairs, and uncertainties with
respect to the succession in China have contributed to calls for a reex-
amination of the concept of great power governance through the mecha-
nism of the Security Council. There was considerable agreement among
the participants during the recent fiftieth anniversary celebrations that
the Security Council will need to be restructured if it is to play an
effective role in future global peace management.3 Its failure to play a
meaningful role in the Bosnia peace process is a clear illustration of
some of the inherent structural weaknesses in the existing scheme.
While the Security Council needs to be restructured and democratized,
this will have to be done in the context of overall reform of the United
Nations itself. In the context of global peace management, the roles of
the General Assembly and Secretary-General will need greater clarifica-
tion during this reform process.
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. J.S.D., Yale Law
School (1969), LL.M., Yale Law School (1966), LL.B., London University (1965). I would
like to thank Jennifer Regis-Civetta for her research assistance.
1. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
2. Id. art. 24.
3. See, e.g., Letter from the Representatives of Egypt and Senegal, U.N. GAOR, 50th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 29, 50, and 163 at 13, U.N. Doc A/50/561 (1995); see also
Ingvar Carlsson, The U.N. at 50: A Time for Reform, 100 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 6 (1995).
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Beyond proposals for structural reform, there is need for a clear
articulation of the role of the United Nations as we enter the next centu-
ry. Speeches read at the United Nations during last year's celebrations
clearly demonstrate near unanimous agreement in favor, of a continuing
role for the United Nations in global peace management.4 What was
lacking from these speeches was a clear vision of what that role should
be. To the extent that future threats to peace are unlikely to involve
cross-border conflicts, the role of the Security Council will have to be
redefined as many countries increasingly face threats from internal
cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious conflicts. Some of these internal
conflicts will have an external dimension through the displacement of
persons across national boundaries. Rwandan refugees in Burundi,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire, for example, are posing a security threat
in these four countries. The Security Council needs to be reenvisioned in
a manner that enables it to deal with such issues effectively.
In addition to internal conflicts, there are other cross-border issues
which cannot be managed effectively by individual countries. Among
such issues are terrorism, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, arms smug-
gling, and recently reported incidents of trafficking in nuclear materials.
These developments will significantly contribute to state and individual
insecurity. Finally, national stability will be threatened in those states
where national authorities fail to promote human rights within the
framework of democracy and the rule of law.
Effective responses to these emerging threats will be achieved only
if the United Nations is restructured in a manner that enables it to work
in coordination with other organizations. According to the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, there are at present
31 ongoing wars, 26 million internally displaced persons and 23 million
refugees. It is predicted that man-made disasters alone will strike 350
million people by the year 2000. 5 These developments will create a level
of global insecurity of daunting proportions. To manage security threats
of this magnitude, the international community will need to structure an
integrated global peace management strategy. In this context, the Bosnia
peace settlement provides a model for future peace management. Under
the Dayton Peace Agreement, U.S.-led NATO peacekeeping forces will
act as a buffer by ensuring that Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims
4. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSA-
RY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMEMORATION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS; DRAFT DECLARATION at 1 5, U.N. Doc. A/AC.240/1995/CRP. 10.
5. Cathryn J. Prince, World Aid Groups Snuggle Up to the Camera, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 26, 1995, at 1, 7.
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stay in their own "zone of separation. They will also try to establish a
balance of military power between the opposing forces. Of greater
interest in terms of future approaches to peace management is the part
of the agreement on peacebuilding. Under the peacebuilding formula, a
multidimensional structure will be established to deal with the new
constitution, human rights, resettlement of refugees, civilian policing,
renegotiation of property claims, preservation of national monuments,
and reconstruction of infrastructure. While the Implementation Force
(IFOR) will operate under NATO, a diverse group of governmental and
private organizations will implement different aspects of the accord.
There are several aspects of the Bosnian peace settlement that have
serious implications for the Security Council's future peace management
strategy. First, there appears to be emerging a realization that future
global peace management efforts must extend beyond traditional peace-
keeping. Limited successes in past peacekeeping activities in Somalia,
Haiti, Cambodia, and El Salvador have contributed to a reevaluation of
past peacekeeping activities.
Second, the marginalization of the United Nations in the Bosnia
peace settlement brings into question the Security Council's ability to
play a central role in future peace management efforts. Future conflicts
are likely to fall into two broad categories. In the first category will be
conflicts that attract the attention of the major powers. Thus conflicts in
Iran and Iraq, threat to oil supplies in the Middle East, instability in the
Korean peninsula, the Arab-Israeli conflict, threats to the South China
sea lanes and instability in Central America will attract the attention of
the United States, Europe, Japan, Russia, and China.7 With respect to
such disputes, the major powers will resist any effort to entrust effective
executive decisionmaking in the Security Council. Bosnia has already
demonstrated that. The second category of conflicts will involve con-
flicts in parts of the world that have no significant strategic interests to
the major powers. Peace management responsibilities with respect to this
category of conflicts will fall primarily on the Security Council. African
conflicts will fall in this category.
As the major powers continue to lose interest in Africa, the Security
Council will likely assume a greater peace management role in Africa.
In fact, as most of the regions of the world develop effective regional
peace management structures, it is quite possible that the Security
Council will in the next century be primarily concerned with problems
6. Bosnia Peace Agreement, Annex 1 art. IV, available online at URL <http:/www.unm.
edu/-vuksan/mario/peace2.html> (copy on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
7. See Prince, supra note 5, at 7.
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of African insecurity. Using the African situation as an illustration, this
essay will propose how the Security Council should redefine its vision
as it prepares to deal with the new problems of global insecurity. The
essay is divided into three parts. Part I examines sources of African
insecurity. In Part II, a brief examination of the role of the Security
Council in five African peace management efforts is made. Part III
makes a case for the development of effective peace management strate-
gies.
I. SOURCES OF AFRICAN INSECURITY
In his 1995 Apostolic Exhortation titled Ecclesia in Africa, His
Holiness Pope John Paul II identified "increasing poverty, urbanization,
the international debt, the arms trade, the problem of refugees and
displaced persons, demographic concerns, the spread of AIDS, the
survival of the practice of slavery, ethnocentricity, and tribal opposition"
as among the "fundamental challenges" that face Africa. He urged
African leaders to work toward corruption-free societies based on demo-
cratic principles and the rule of law.8 Underlying the Pope's admonition
is the realization that security of the African states will be assured only
if the security of people and the continent as a whole is assured. Under
this new conception of security, mechanisms must be created for the
protection of human rights and for the advancement of the human
environment. Additionally, this new conception of security requires the
adoption of United Nations peace management strategies that give it the
capability to anticipate and prevent security threats. Where conflicts
have already occurred, the United Nations should be given sufficient re-
sources to effectively manage them. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
has recommended this approach in his Agenda for Peace.9
Other external and internal factors have contributed to African
insecurity. African debt problems, the export of arms to Africa, and
unfair trade terms have created patterns of dependence which seriously
undermine the stability of the African states. Internally, colonial bound-
aries and institutions imposed on the African states at the time of inde-
pendence will continue to be a source of African instability as long as
these institutions are not restructured in a manner that reflects indige-
8. Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia in Africa, ORIGINS (Cath. News Service), Oct. 5, 1995, at
249, 250.
9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-Keeping, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10 at 13, U.N. Doc. A/47/277
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 953 [hereinafter Agenda for Peace].
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nous values.'0 Social, economic, humanitarian, and ecological problems
have also contributed to African insecurity.
Africa is a vast and diverse continent with states at different stages
of social, economic, and political development. For purpose of analysis,
the African states may be divided into five groups. In the first group
there are the "newly democratizing" -states. Examples of countries in this
group are Eritrea, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe. These countries will continue to enjoy a measure of
stability if they are able to address problems of corruption, crime, pover-
ty, and bad governance. A second group of countries may be classified
as the "failing" states. Burundi, Sudan, and Zaire are examples .of "fail-
ing" states. Drastic internal reforms and preventive diplomacy by the
Security Council in cooperation with other organizations would probably
save these countries from "failure." A third category of countries may
be classified as the "failed" states. Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and
Somalia are examples of the "failed" states. Here, the Security Council
in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other
humanitarian organizations would have to embark on an integrated plan
of nation building based on the Bosnia model. Fourth, Angola, Ethiopia,
and Mozambique may be classified as the "recovering" states. In the
case of Mozambique, and to some extent Angola, the United Nations
has succeeded in putting these states on the road to recovery. Finally,
Ghana and Uganda may be classified as the "recovered" states. After a
long period of political and civil strife, these countries have, with the
assistance of international financial institutions, reformed their internal
economic and political institutions in a manner that has resulted in a
measure of political stability.
II. EMERGING STRATEGIES FOR AFRICAN PEACE MANAGEMENT
The United Nations has been involved in African peace management
since the 1960 Congo (now Zaire) crisis. Military assistance to the
government of the Congo was initially authorized by the Security Coun-
cil." Following the Soviet veto of several operative resolutions on the
matter, the General Assembly authorized the secretary-general to provide
assistance to the central government of the Congo under the authority of
the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. 2 External forces and ideological
10. Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113
(1995).
11. S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 873d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
12. G.A. Res. 1474 (ES-IV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. I at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/4510 (1960).
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considerations played a major role in the Congo operation. The Soviet
Union supported Prime Minister Patric6 Lumumba, the West supported
President Joseph Kasavubu, and powerful Belgian business interests
supported Mois6 Tschombe, leader of the mineral-rich secessionist
province of Katanga. These external forces had a distorting effect on the
entire Congo peacekeeping operation. The Congo operation, therefore,
does not provide a helpful model for future African peace management.
In 1968 the Security Council voted for sanctions against Rhodesia
(now Zimbabwe).' 3 The Security Council imposed an arms embargo
against South Africa in 1977"' and urged member states to suspend new
investments in South Africa. 5 While the Security Council determined
that the acquisition of arms by South Africa threatened international
peace and security under Chapter VII, none of the coercive measures
permitted under Articles 41 and 42 were taken. An attempt to recom-
mend coercive measures would have been vetoed almost certainly since
significant western economic interests were at stake.
In his Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General has articulated his
vision of United Nations peace management, one which goes beyond
traditional peacekeeping. Under his formulation, peace management
must involve preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and
peacebuilding. Effective implementation of the Secretary-General's
vision will necessitate the creation of an effective and integrated peace-
management structure within the United Nations, adequate resources,
and a formalized machinery for cooperation between the United Nations
and other organizations. This new vision of peace management has been
tested in Africa with some success.
In the past decade, peacekeeping operations in Africa have been
expanded to include large-scale military and civilian deployments in
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Western Sahara.
In all these cases, the United Nations interceded either to promote
peaceful transitions to democracy and independence or to foster political
reconciliation and protect humanitarian relief efforts.
In addition to the traditional peacekeeping efforts, the United Na-
tions has attempted to restore political order in the "failing" states.
Under this expanded interpretation of the Charter, peacekeeping opera-
tions have included monitoring and securing free elections and facilitat-
ing peace negotiations among rival intra-state factions. In this way the
United Nations has tried to prevent countries from "failing." This sec-
13. S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1428th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (1968).
14. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 2046th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (1977).
15. S.C. Res. 569, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2602d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/569 (1985).
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tion of the essay will briefly examine the Security Council's peace
management strategies in the six African conflicts mentioned above.
A. Angola
Angola has presented the international community with one of the
most intractable conflicts on the African continent. When Portugal
granted independence to Angola in 1975, the Movimento Popular de
Libertagdo de Angola (MPLA) assumed power after power sharing
efforts with the Unido National para a Independ~ncia Total de Angola
(UNITA) failed. UNITA immediately took up arms against the MPLA
government. The MPLA had been supported by the Soviet Union for
many years. UNITA was openly supported by South Africa and Zaire
and covertly by the United States and other western interests. These
external forces continued to support their respective clients after the
grant of independence in 1975. As the political movement recognized by
the OAU and the majority of the African states, the MPLA had felt
obliged to support the South West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) during its liberation struggle in South West Africa (now
Namibia). South Africa responded by embarking on a major
destabilization campaign in Angola. Threatened by the South African
campaign, the MPLA government invited Cuban troops into Angola.
The presence of Cuban troops in Angola resulted in the so-called "link-
age" formula advocated by the United States and South Africa. Under
this formula, the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and
South Africa's acceptance of independence for Namibia was linked to
the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Security Council has
always had difficult peace management problems whenever a conflict
has ideological or great power elements. The Angolan conflict proved to
be no exception. In fact, serious peacemaking in Angola was conducted
under the auspices of the United States acting in cooperation with the
Soviet Union and South Africa. The Security Council came in at the
peacekeeping and peacebuilding stages.
In December 1988, the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South
Africa signed an agreement providing for the complete withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola. In response to requests by Angola and
Cuba, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was
established to monitor the withdrawal.1 6 Additionally, Angola requested
the United Nations to remain in Angola and monitor the cease-fire
agreement. Subsequent to this, the Security Council established
16. S.C. Res. 626, U.N. SCOR, 43d Sess., 2834th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/626 (1988).
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UNAVEM II to observe Angola's elections in September 1992.17 The
deteriorating political situation led to a resumption of the conflict soon
after the elections. This resulted in the imposition of an oil and arms
embargo on UNITA by the Security Council in September 19931 8 The
United Nations continued its peace management efforts after the embar-
go. These efforts culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol be-
tween UNITA and MPLA in November 1994.19 UNAVEM II's mandate
was subsequently expanded to include monitoring and verifying all the
major aspects of the Lusaka Protocol. 20
The Angolan peace management strategy has achieved limited
success. Two factors have undermined the United Nations' efforts in
Angola. First, the external actors who were present at crucial points in
the conflict had the tendency of forging alliances with internal political
organizations. In a majority of cases, these alliances were ethnic-based,
thereby exacerbating divisiveness. Second, the Security Council's confi-
dence-building strategy failed. In his Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-
General has identified confidence-building as one of the major compo-
nents of present-day peace management.2 Some of the warring parties,
for example, did not believe that United Nations peace mediators were
impartial. Regional mediators appointed by the OAU who are acceptable
to the contending parties should be accorded greater roles in the future.
The decision by the United States in cooperation with Portugal and
Russia to reenter the Angolan peace management process suggests that
serious peacemaking is in most conflicts not achievable without the
participation of the major powers.
B. Mozambique & Namibia
In Mozambique, the Security Council carried out a successful peace
management strategy that rescued the country from possible "failure."
Immediately after the grant of independence to Mozambique by Portugal
in 1975, a bitter civil conflict erupted between the Frente de Libertaqdo
de Mogambique (FRELIMO) government and the Resist~ncia National
Mogambicana (RENAMO). RENAMO was created by .disaffected Portu-
guese colonists opposed to the independence of Mozambique in collabo-
17. S.C. Res. 696, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2991st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/696 (1991).
18. S.C. Res. 864, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3277th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (1993).
19. Special Edition, U.N. Fiftieth Anniversary, 1945-1995, 1995 U.N.Y.B. 33, U.N. Sales
No. E.95.I.50 [hereinafter U.N. FIFrIETH].
20. S.C. Res. 966, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3477th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/966
(1994).
21. Agenda for Peace, supra note 9, at 1 24.
[Vol. 17:537
Security Council in African Peace Management
ration with Rhodesian and South African security interests. Powerful
Brazilian and Portuguese business interests allegedly provided some of
the financing that sustained RENAMO during its long struggle with the
FRELIMO government. Undisciplined, with no clear political agenda,
RENAMO was created as part of apartheid's and White Rhodesia's
strategy to destabilize the "socialist" government of Mozambique and
the Front Line states. As in Angola,. there was an external dimension to
the Mozambican conflict which slowed down the peacemaking process.22
A General Peace Agreement was finally signed in October 1992.23
With the signing of the peace agreement, Mozambique invited the
United Nations to "undertake a major role in monitoring implementation
of. the Agreement, and to perform specific functions in relation to the
cease-fire, elections, and humanitarian assistance. 24 The United Nations
established the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
in December 1992 with a mandate that included political, military,
electoral, and humanitarian assistance. 25 ONUMOZ interpreted its man-
date to include general verification of police activities and the protection
of civil rights.26 Demobilization of forces began in March 1994. General
elections were held in October 1994, and a freely elected president was
sworn in on December 9.27 ONUMOZ's mandate formally ended at
midnight on the same day. 28 The end of the Mozambican conflict con-
tributed to an improved security situation in the region as over two
million refugees were able to return from the neighboring states.
The Mozambique peace management operation was a success. In
Mozambique, the United Nations was engaged in a clearly defined
peacebuilding operation that requited limited personnel and resources.
That to a large extent explains the success. The Security Council has
mounted similarly successful operations where the mandate was clear
and there was no significant military component to the operation.
The Namibian operation is another example of such a successful
United Nations peace management operation. In the Namibian operation,
the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was autho-
22. U.N. FIFrIETH, supra note 19, at 50.
23. General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/24635/Annex (1992).
24. U.N. FIFTIETH, supra note 19, at 50.
25. S.C. Res. 797, 47th Sess., 3149th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/797 (1992); see also U.N.
FIFriETH, supra note 19, at 50.
26. U.N: FIFrIETH, supra note 19, at 50.
27. Mozambique Leader Wins Multiparty Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at A16; U.N.
FIFTIETH, supra note 19, at 51.
28. U.N. FIFnETH, supra note 19, at 51.
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rized by the Security Council to supervise the 1988 peace agreement
between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa.29 This agreement made possi-
ble the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibian
independence.30 UNTAG was also authorized to prepare Namibia for
general elections and eventual independence. UNTAG's responsibilities
included
monitoring the dismantling of the South African military presence
and the confinement of the forces of SWAPO to base; monitoring
the conduct of the South West African police; ensuring the repeal
of discriminatory laws; amnesty and release of prisoners and
detainees; assisting in the return of refugees; and registration of
voters and supervision and control of the electoral process.31
During the three month period from July to September 1989, UNTAG
registered over 700,000 Namibians. It also monitored the elections, and
assisted in drafting the Constitution. Namibia declared its independence
in March 1990.32 Mozambique and Namibia provide possible models for
future United Nations peace management operations in Africa.
C. Rwanda
Rwanda has a long and sordid history of ethnic conflict between the
Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority.33 In October 1990, a full-scale
conflict broke out between the Rwanda government forces and the
Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), renewing ethnic conflict in the
region. In August 1993, the two parties signed a peace agreement in
Arusha, Tanzania. In response to a request from the two parties for a
neutral international implementation force, the United Nations estab-
lished the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in
October 1993. UNAMIR's mandate was to supervise the election and
installation of a new government by December 1995. 35
The security situation in Rwanda deteriorated almost overnight with
the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a suspicious plane
29. Id.
30. S.C. Res. 435, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., 2987th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/435 (1978).
31. U.N. FIFTIETH, supra note 19, at 51.
32. Christopher S. Wren, Namibia Achieves Independence After 75 Years of Pretoria's
Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1990, at Al.
33. U.N. FIFrIETH, supra note 19, at 51.
34. Accord Ends 3-Year Civil War in Rwanda, N.Y. IMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at A12; see
also U.N. FIFTIETH, supra note 19, at 51.
35. S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg. at 9 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872
(1993).
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crash near Kigali, Rwanda in April 1994.36 Rwanda plunged into a state
of total chaos as massive ethnic violence swept the country. In the
weeks that followed, over 500,000 people were killed, as many as 2
million people were internally displaced, and more than 2 million refu-
gees fled into Zaire, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania.37 The Rwanda
situation was an unprecedented humanitarian crisis whose solution was
beyond UNAMIR's mandate. 38 In May 1994 the Security Council autho-
rized UNAMIR to "contribute to the security and protection of displaced
persons, refugees and civilians... [and to] provide security and support
for.., relief operations., ' 39 The Security Council additionally imposed
an arms embargo on Rwanda.' UNAMIR played a significant humani-
tarian role.4 ' In November 1994, the Security Council established an
international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for
genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law.42
The Rwanda conflict has created an exceedingly complex peace
management problem. Outside Rwanda, there are more than 30,000
Hutu soldiers under arms, a complete government, and one-third of
Rwanda's population believed to be loyal to the Hutu forces. Inside
Rwanda, there are 50,000 soldiers under arms and a minority Tutsi
government in Kigali. Recently, exiled Hutu soldiers have begun to
infiltrate Rwanda while the presence of so many Rwandan refugees is
destabilizing the entire Central African region.43 In light of the failure by
the Security Council to develop an effective peace management strategy
for Rwanda, former President Jimmy Carter has been exploring the
36. Paul Lewis, 2 Africa Leaders Die, U.N. Says; Rocket May Have Downed Plane, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at Al; Raymond Bonner, Unsolved Rwanda Mystery: The President's
Plane Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at Al.
37. U.N. FIFnETH, supra note 19, at 52.
38. Id. The United Nations has stated that:
According to estimates, Rwanda's pre-war population of 7.9 million had fallen to 5
million by October, and internally displaced persons numbered from 800,000 to 2
million. There were more than 2 million refugees in Zaire, the United Republic of
Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. At the same time, it was estimated that some
360,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda spontaneously since the cease-fire on 18
July. The victims of the genocidal slaughter could number as many as I million.
Id.
39. S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doe. SIRES/918
(1994).
40. Id. at 13.
41. U.N. FIFTIETH, supra note 19, at 232.
42. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1 1, U.N. Doe S/RES/955
(1994).
43. Joyce Hackel, A Genocide Later, Rwanda Again on Edge, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 28, 1995, at 1.
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possibility of a regional collective peace management effort by Central
African leaders.
D. Somalia
For decades, Somalia has been torn by civil and inter-clan conflict.
In January 1991, President Mohamad Siad Barre fled the country."
Fighting among rival clans resulted in a major humanitarian crisis. By
early 1992 civil authority in Somalia had collapsed. The United States,
with the consent of the United Nations, intervened for humanitarian
reasons. In 1993, the United Nations established the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) with a mandate to restore peace and
protect humanitarian relief operations.4" While UNOSOM, in conjunc-
tion with NGOs and other organizations, was able to alleviate mass
starvation, it was unable to successfully manage the deteriorating securi-
ty situation in the country and around Mogadishu. When UNOSOM's
mandate' expired on March 31, 1995, neither the Somali factions nor the
humanitarian agencies and NGOs requested an extension.46 United
Nations peace management efforts had failed.
E. Western Sahara
After almost two decades of strife between Morocco and the Frente
para la Liberaci6n de Sagufa el-Hamra y de Ri6 Oro (Polisario Front),
the two sides signed a cease-fire agreement in 1990.47 The United Na-
tions, in cooperation with the OAU, prepared the territory to hold a
referendum to determine whether it should declare its independence or
remain under Moroccan rule. Despite several delays due to "fundamental
differences in the interpretation of the main provisions of the plan for
the settlement of the conflict, particularly with respect to the criteria for
the eligibility to vote," the United Nations Mission for the Referendum
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) successfully monitored the cease-fire
agreement." The Secretary-General had hoped that June 1, 1995 could
serve as the starting date for the transitional period and that the referen-
dum could be held in October 1995. The referendum originally sched-
uled for 1992 still had not taken place by the end of 1995. Prospects for
44. U.N. FIFInETH, supra note 19, at 52, 233.
45. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 4-6, U.N. Doc. SIRES/814
(1993).
46. U.N. FIFTTH, supra note 19, at 52.
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id.
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the referendum have deteriorated due to fundamental differences be-
tween Morocco and the Polisario Front over the criteria for registering
eligible voters.49
After Spain's announcement that it would grant independence to
Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco invaded and occupied Western Saha-
ra. The Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, was on the verge of driving
out the Moroccan forces in 1981 when massive arms transfers and
counterinsurgency support by the United States reversed Polisario's
military successes. Most of the native Sahrawi people fled Western
Sahara and presently remain in refugee camps in Algeria. The right of
the Sahrawi people to self-determination has been endorsed by the
International Court of Justice, the United Nations, and the OAU. 50 Over
seventy-five states have recognized Western Sahara's independence. In a
unanimous resolution in December 1995, the Security Council reaf-
firmed its determination to hold the referendum. The Polisario Front is
opposed to the United Nations plan for the referendum which is essen-
tially based on the Moroccan plan. The Secretary-General has threatened
to withdraw MINURSO if there is no agreement. 5'
External factors have contributed to the failure of the Security
Council to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. First, the Polisario is
backed by Algeria. Some in the West have therefore associated the
Polisario with Islamic fundamentalism even though the Polisario does
not embrace Islamic fundamentalism. The Polisario Front has in fact
adopted a rather liberal interpretation of Islam, has never supported
terrorism, and advocates free markets.5 2 Second, France supports Moroc-
co as part of its geopolitical strategy in Africa. The United States and
other western countries see Morocco as a buffer against the expansion of
radical Islam.
The United Nations' confidence-building strategy in Western Sahara
has been a failure. The Polisario Front, for example, has accused Secre-
49. Morocco Ends Year Unsettled Economically and Politically, Compass Newswire,
Dec. 29, 1995, at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library, Compas File. The Polisario Front
has argued that the 1974 Spanish census should be the only basis for voter registration, while
Morocco argues that 100,000 Moroccans of alleged Saharan extraction should be included. Id.
50. E.g., Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 35 (Oct. 16); S.C. Res. 621, U.N. SCOR, 43d
Sess., 2826th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/621 (1988); see Laurence S. Hanauer, The Irrelevance
of Self-Determination to Ethno-National Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case, 9
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 133, 167 (1995) (stating that Western Sahara was admitted to the
OAU, whose Charter allows only "independent sovereign African states"); see also Stephen
Zunes, Moroccan Hegemony is Given a Clear Path in Western Sahara, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 23, 1995, at B7.
51. Press Digest: Morocco, Reuters World Service, Dec. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
52. Zunes, supra note 50, at B7.
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tary-General Boutros-Ghali of bias in favor of Morocco because of his
personal friendship with Moroccan King Hassan.53 In the eyes of the
Polisario Front, the December 1995 Security Council resolution is a
deliberate attempt to guarantee victory for Morocco in the proposed
referendum. Unless the Security Council adopts a voter registration
formula that is acceptable to all the contending parties, the entire peace
management effort in Western Sahara will most likely collapse.
III. DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE PEACE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
United Nations peace management successes in Mozambique and
Namibia, limited successes in Angola and Western Sahara, and failures
in Rwanda and Somalia have called into question the efficacy of exist-
ing United Nations peace management mechanisms. One writer has sug-
gested that "[s]erious peacekeeping ... should be left to serious armies
[and] regional trouble to regional groups. 54 Under this approach, United
Nations forces would be sent into a peace management operation to
perform peacebuilding functions only after the fighting is over. Preven-
tive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping would be conducted
outside the United Nations peace management framework.
The above argument raises some fundamental issues about future
global peace management strategies: Is the United Nations, as presently
structured, capable of guaranteeing global peace and security or should
some power-center or centers be created outside the United Nations
peace management system? How will such centers be structured? Let us
assume, for example, that the G-7 countries decided to create their own
global peace management center, how would that be related to the
United Nations peace management system? How would it accommodate
emerging regional powers such as Brazil, China, India, and South Afri-
ca?
This essay takes the position that global peace and security can be
guaranteed only if the international community is able to restructure the
United Nations peace management system in a manner that preserves the
United Nations' role as the primary forum for initial action when threats
to peace or breaches of peace occur. Under this approach, the Security
Council should be restructured in a manner that enables it to make
maximum use of the dispute settlement mechanisms available to it under
Chapter VI. When the dispute reaches the level requiring Chapter VII
53. See id.
54. Can It Keep the Peace?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995, at 18, 18 [hereinafter Keep the
Peace?].
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measures, some structure should be devised whereby disputes that are
beyond the capability of the United Nations could be delegated to some
other organization or regional group. This structure would be particular-
ly important with respect to those disputes that attract great power
interest. Preliminary authorization of coercive measures would continue
to reside in the United Nations with provision for the organization to
take over once the delegated organization had stabilized the situation.
Haiti offers a good illustration of how such a system would operate.
While the United Nations Security Council authorized coercive action
for the restoration of President Aristide to power,55 the actual operation
was carried out by the United States. United Nations peacekeeping
forces came in at a much later stage for the purpose of assisting in
peacebuilding. The Persian Gulf War provides another example of this
authorization concept. Because the United Nations did not have the
resources to carry out coercive measures against Iraq under Chapter VII
of the Charter, the Security Council authorized member states, in coop-
eration with the Government of Kuwait, to use all necessary means to
force Iraqi armed forces to withdraw from Kuwaiti territory and to
restore "international peace and security" in the area if Iraq did not
withdraw its forces from Kuwaiti territory by January 16, 1991.56
However, the authorization or delegation of functions by the Securi-
ty Council to other entities does create a number of problems as the
Persian Gulf War demonstrated. First, pressure on the Security Council
to authorize action in Kuwait came primarily from the United States.
Due to the tremendous political and economic power that the United
States now wields over the United Nations, there is some question as to
whether the United States unduly prevailed upon the United Nations.
Second, the manner in which Chapter VII of the Charter was interpreted
has also raised some questions. Two non-permanent and non-veto-wield-
ing powers (Cuba and Yemen) questioned whether use of force under
Article 42 could be taken before it was determined that non-forceful
measures under Article 41 had failed. Finally, in situations like the
Persian Gulf War, questions of interpretation of the mandate will arise
55. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
56. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990).
57. See generally Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 452, 455-56 (1991). Former President Jimmy Carter reportedly took the position that
the United Nations should not have authorized forceful measures against Iraq before exhaust-
ing the possibility of "good faith talks." See Douglas Brinkley, Jimmy Carter's Quest for
Global Peace, 74 FOREIGN Arr. 90, 95 (1995).
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once the Security Council has authorized action. Events after the cease-
fire in the Gulf War provide a good illustration. After reports of wide-
spread human rights abuses by the Iraqi forces against the Kurds and
Shiites, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688 in April 1991,
which, among other things, authorized the Secretary-General to explore
humanitarian efforts in cooperation with other United Nations agencies
and to send a mission to the region.58 The resolution did not authorize
the use of force. Britain, France, and the United States subsequently
created "safe havens" in Northern Iraq for the protection of the Kurds,
arguing that the humanitarian aspects of the resolution granted them the
right to do so. This interpretation is questionable. Where operations have
been delegated by the Security Council to outside organizations, the
mandate will in future have to be spelled out more clearly.
The pre-authorizing or delegating role that has been proposed in the
preceding paragraphs can be achieved more efficiently through an
integrated global peace management system that clearly defines the roles
of the United Nations, its member states, and other international organi-
zations. Recent efforts illustrate how this might be structurally accom-
plished. In 1980, the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, assembled
representatives of the United Nations, Organization of American States,
OAU, and the (British) Commonwealth to explore the possibility of
establishing a global peacekeeping system. Two ideas emerged from the
conference. First, that the Secrietary-General of each of the four organi-
zations would establish a list of experienced mediators who could be
called upon to engage in preventive diplomacy in areas where potential
for disputes existed. Second, the representatives proposed to establish
mechanisms for subcontracting out peacekeeping to regional organiza-
tions for any conflicts that are not global in nature. In cases that in-
volved complicated policing activities such as spy satellite reconnais-
sance or sophisticated troop training, these complex activities would be
subcontracted to those countries with the best capabilities in that area.59
This essay proposes that the United Nations should convene a broad
based conference consisting of regional and subregional organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and other interested parties to explore
the possibility of establishing a global peace management system.
58. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
59. See Peace (Keeping) on Earth, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1995, at 20.
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A. Proposed Changes
1. Structural Changes
The framers of the U.N. Charter decided to place primary responsi-
bility for the' maintenance of international peace and security in the
Security Council. In turn, the Security Council was formed as a system
of big power governance in which the victors in the Second World War
granted authority to themselves through the veto and permanent mem-
bership on the Security Council. Any system of global peace manage-
ment that was based on unanimous agreement between five countries on
every important issue was bound to fail. With the advent of the Cold
War as early as 1946, the United Nations collective security mechanism
had become practically paralyzed. In the period of almost fifty years be-
tween 1945 and 1990, the Security Council found threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression on only six occasions even
though there have been over 100 conflicts since 1945 that have left 20
million people dead.W Since its inception, the Security Council has
authorized the use of collective force only in Korea and the Gulf War.6'
Between 1946 and 1990, the Security Council passed 646 resolutions,
with 201 resolutions failing to pass because of the veto.62
In structuring the Security Council, the framers of the U.N. Charter
were operating in a world of fifty years ago, a world that has now
disappeared. They did not, for example, anticipate, that the Soviet Union
would itself be viewed as a threat to international peace soon after the
United Nations had been established. Additionally, they created a Secu-
rity Council that had no executive authority and no institutional struc-
tures to support its activities. Frequent use of the veto by the Soviet
Union led to the emergence of the General Assembly as the more func-
tional organ in the sense that the West could, at least in the earlier years
of the United Nations, muster sufficient majorities to pass General
Assembly resolutions. In time, however, the General Assembly's lack of
enforcement powers led to the emergence of the secretary-general as the
principal peace management official. The framers' undue faith in the
Security Council that they were structuring is reflected in the fact that
Chapters VI and VII do not even mention the secretary-general.63
60. Agenda for Peace, supra note 9, at 14; Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 968 (3d ed. 1993).
61. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 968.
62. Carlsson, supra note 3, at 6.
63. See Robert L. Armitage, Bring the United Nations Ba'k from Superstate Status to Its
Roots, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 31, 1995, at 19.
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Dag Hammarskj6ld's activities in the Congo were the first indica-
tions of this structural shift in the United Nations peace management
machinery. Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and
recent non-exercise of the veto power by the permanent members, the
Security Council appears unable to reassert its formal authority over
global peace management. In fact, a further structural shift is occurring
as the Secretariat, led by an activist secretary-general in the
Hammarskj6ld tradition continues to dominate United Nations peace
management.
It is clear from speeches at the recent fiftieth anniversary celebra-
tions that world leaders generally agree that a formula must be found
that enables the United Nations to retain its role as the primary forum
for global peace management while at the same time taking notice of
contemporary shifts in global power. It will fall on the members of the
United Nations to restructure the organization in a manner that reflects
the existing world order.
These structural reforms will have to occur at two levels. The first
level will involve a clear definition of the purposes of the United Na-
tions. The United Nations as presently structured is unwieldy, bureau-
cratic, and too expensive. Under Article 1 of the Charter, among the
principal purposes of the Charter are the maintenance of international
peace and the promotion of economic development. In order to carry out
its economic development responsibilities, the United Nations has creat-
ed a proliferation of economic agencies whose usefulness is now being
questioned. Notable among these are the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO), and the regional economic com-
missions. Proposals have been made to abolish UNCTAD and UNIDO;
the activities that demonstrate a real contribution to economic develop-
ment would be transferred to other United Nations agencies or private
organizations. Further, the regional economic commissions would be
integrated with other regional political and economic institutions. The
entities that emerged out of this merger would then forge their own
links with international economic and financial institutions. The Lom6
Convention 6' arrangement offers a possible model for this. Additional
proposals have also been made to abolish the Economic and Social
Council and the Trusteeship Council. Under these proposals, the United
Nations would become primarily a peace management organization.
65
64. Fourth ACP-EEC [Lomb] Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 809.
65. See, e.g., Keep the Peace?, supra note 54, at 18.
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The remaining four organs (the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the
Security Council, and the International Court of Justice) would have to
be restructured in a manner that would reflect this new role.
The second level of reforms would entail a clarification of the
relationship between the General Assembly, the secretary-general, and
the Security Council. Adequate machinery would have to be instituted to
enable the United Nations to mobilize and utilize peace management re-
sources adequately.
In a restructured United Nations, the Security Council would contin-
ue to be the primary organ for peace management. Its size would need
to be modestly increased to make it more representative, and the veto
power and permanent membership would have to be addressed. Its
procedures would have to be democratized in order to make them more
transparent. Several structural proposals have been made along these
lines. The proposal that seems to be supported by the United States
would bring Germany and Japan into the Security Council as permanent
members. Italy, the other defeated power in World War II, opposes this
elevation. Most Third World countries and emerging regional powers,
such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, would find this concentration of
power in the northern industrialized countries unacceptable.
Another proposal which merits further consideration would create
four categories of membership: rotating members; tenured members;
first, second, and third rank members; and members without veto power.
Under this proposal, the veto power would either be abolished, or the
countries wielding the veto power would promise to exercise it only in
exceptional cases. Germany, for example, has indicated that it would
never use the veto on its own. 66 However, three of the five members
(United States, Britain, and France) that wield the veto power are signif-
icant financial contributors to United Nations peace management opera-
tions. They therefore see their ability to veto operations as a right which
they are entitled to exercise. Consequently, they are unlikely to agree to
a restructured Security Council that weakened or abolished the veto.
The Commission on Global Governance has proposed a negotiated
reform process over a fairly extended period of time. Under the Com-
mission's proposal, the Security Council would be enlarged to make it
more representative. A new class of five "standing" members would be
created until a further review in the year 2005. The number of rotating
members would go from ten to thirteen, the five permanent members
would agree to forgo use of the veto except in exceptional circumstances
66. United Nations: To Bury or to Praise, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995, at 23, 27 [herein-
after Bury or Praise].
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while the review proposed for the year 2005 would decide on phasing out
the veto, the criteria for future Security Council membership, and arrange-
ments for regular reviews in the future. 67 The Commission, co-chaired by
the Prime Minister of Sweden and a Guyanese citizen (who has occu-
pied the position of.Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations)
was selected on the basis of fair geographical representation. Its recom-
mendations need to form the basis for future discussions on reforming
the Security Council.
2. Financial Changes
Beyond structural reforms, it is imperative that the manner in which
the United Nations finances its peace management operations should be
reformed. In the past, United Nations operations have taken place on the
basis of willingness on the part of major industrial countries to contrib-
ute to such operations. New revenue enhancement mechanisms must be
devised. As a starting point, the present system of assessing membership
dues needs to be improved. Regular United Nations dues are based on a
country's share of world GNP with adjustments made for population
numbers. The General Assembly has power under Article 19 to impose
sanctions against member states that pay less than their assessed contri-
butions or refuse to pay.6s Ways that enable member states to pay their
assessed dues without experiencing undue hardship should be explored.
For peacekeeping purposes, United Nations members are divided into
permanent members of the Security Council; developed countries; less
developed countries; and the least developed countries, with the Security
Council members receiving the highest assessments. The United Nations
assessment system needs restructuring. Saudi Arabia and Singapore, for
example, are assessed as "less developed" countries whereas Russia and
Ukraine are assessed at a much higher level. The system should be
revised so that assessments more accurately reflect each country's
current economic situation.69 The Global Commission's proposals to
67. COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD 233-41 (1995)
[hereinafter GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD].
68. Article 19 provides in pertinent part:
A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial
contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the
amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it
for the preceding two full years.
U.N. CHARTER art. 19.
69. Bury or Praise, supra note 66, at 23, 24; see also Scale of Assessments for the
Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item
112 at 1-6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/19B (1995).
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gradually integrate peacekeeping expenditures into a single United
Nations budget that would be financed by assessments of all members
would bring stability to United Nations revenues, especially if the
member states were willing to sanction defaulters under Article 19.70
Beyond restructuring the assessment system, independent methods of
revenue enhancement need to be explored. The Global Commission has
proposed a comprehensive system of global financing that merits serious
consideration. Among the proposals are an international tax on foreign
exchange transactions, charges for the use of global commons such as
flight lanes, sea lanes, ocean fishing areas, and the electromagnetic
spectrum.71 Similarly, consideration should also be given to the possibil-
ity of granting the United Nations the power to raise money on interna-
tional money markets. Clearly some measures like these need to be
taken, because unless the United Nations' dependency on a few rich
countries is reduced, the organization will never effectively play an
independent international role.
B. The Evolving Nature of Insecurity
A restructured Security Council must be reenvisioned in a manner
that understands the changing nature of global insecurity. As has been
argued elsewhere in this essay, future sources of insecurity will arise
from a multitude of factors not envisaged by the framers of the Charter.
Among these will be ethnic problems, intense poverty, political instabili-
ty, drug trafficking, border conflicts, little internal wars due to internal
social and cultural conflicts, and the emergence of new forms of diseas-
es capable of spreading quickly throughout the world. The average
person in New York, London, or Paris probably defines his or her own
insecurity in terms of protection from the threat of nuclear weapons and-
terrorism. A person living in Luanda probably worries about land mines
whereas a person living in Kinshasa is probably concerned about gov-
ernment corruption and political persecution. These different perceptions
of insecurity will require the Security Council to adopt clear guidelines
for future interventions. In this context, then, the Security Council's
broad interpretation of Article 39 in the Somalia operation provides a
useful precedent.
Future sources of insecurity can be divided into two categories. In
the first category are sources that cause global insecurity. Among these
are chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The international com-
70. GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD, supra note 67, at 113.
71. Id. at 217-21.
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munity needs to develop strategies for eliminating these weapons of
mass destruction. Comprehensive and verifiable measures for denuclear-
ization and total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction must be
taken. Other sources of global insecurity are the emergence of infectious
diseases that are resistant to potent antibiotics and are in some cases
evolving into stronger strains as the global climate changes. The AIDS
and Ebola viruses are the most recent examples of these new diseases.
The United Nations in cooperation with other organizations must inte-
grate these nontraditional threats into an overall global security manage-
ment strategy.
In the second category will be localized threats. In addition to
threats resulting from internal disorders, these local threats will also
result from conventional weapons, including weapons such as land
mines that inflict indiscriminate injuries. Effective machineries for the
curtailment of the arms trade need to be devised and the manufacture
and export of land mines must be outlawed.72
C. Toward an Integrated Peace Management Strategy
This essay has been based on several propositions. First, the Securi-
ty Council must continue to be the global forum through which peace
management issues should be considered or at least initiated. Second,
the Security Council must be restructured and reenvisioned in a manner
that enables it to deal with emerging forms of insecurity. Third, lack of
resources and reluctance on the part of Member States to grant the
Security Council effective peace management capabilities will require
the Council to act in cooperation with other organizations through an
integrated approach to peace management and, in some cases, through a
system of subcontracting or delegation. The Bosnia peace agreement
73
provides an interesting model for future peace management. The Bosnia
peace negotiations were conducted by the United States while the peace-
keeping aspects will be handled by NATO. The Bosnian dispute is a
regional dispute rooted in centuries of European ethnic and religious
disputes. While the European countries did not succeed in bringing
72. The treaty currently in force does not prohibit the manufacture or export of land
mines. See U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate
Effects, October 27, 1980, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. AICONF.95/15 (1980). The
Commission on Global Governance estimates that since 1975 land mines have killed or
injured more than 1 million people, most of them civilians. It estimates that 100 million land
mines are scattered in over sixty countries, while an estimated 100 million additional land
mines are in stockpiles. GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD, supra note 67, at 129-31.
73. See supra note 6.
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about a peace settlement, the United States intervened in the dispute
essentially in its capacity as a member of a regional collective security
organization - NATO. Similarly, a possible conflict between Sudan
and Uganda was recently averted when the President of Malawi, acting
in his capacity as chairman of the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) brought together the presidents of the two
countries. Mechanisms for responding to future national or regional
security threats might be patterned on this model. In the Rwanda con-
flict, for example, the Security Council could work in conjunction with
South Africa and the OAU. While some of these regional organizations
will play limited roles due to lack of resources,74 effective means that
maximize their potential should be devised.
The non-military portion of the Bosnia peace agreement provides an
even better model for future integrated peace management efforts. At
least seven different organizations will be involved in different aspects
of the peacebuilding effort. 75 The Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE), for example, will establish a provisional
election commission to oversee elections while a special commission
under the auspices of the European Court of Human Rights will adjudi-
cate property disputes. The Council of Europe, the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and other
United Nations agencies will play various roles in their specialized
areas.76 It is not clear who will bear the cost of this effort or how the
lines of authority among the various parties to this peace management
effort will function. The structure that eventually emerges from this
operation will provide lessons for future integrated peace management
efforts.
D. Applying the Evolving Strategies to African Peace Management
For purposes of future United Nations peace management, threats to
African states can be divided into two broad groups. In the first group
are the threats faced by the countries that have been classified elsewhere
74. The Liberian peace management effort attempted this strategy by encouraging
Nigeria to settle the conflict in cooperation with the Economic Community of the West Africa
States (ECOWAS). The effort failed in part because of regional suspicions and lack of
resources by ECOWAS.
75. Elizabeth Cousens & Michael Doyle, Dayton Accord's Dangerous Dueling Missions,
CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Dec. 26, 1995, at 23; see, e.g., Bosnia Peace Agreement, supra
note 6, at Annex IA (NATO), Annex 3, art. II, para. 1 (OSCE), Annex 7, art. I, para. 5
(UNHCR), Annex 7, art. III, para. 2 (ICRC and UNDP), Annex 8, art. II, para. 1 (UNESCO),
Annex 10, art. I, para. 2 (Security Council).
76. Cousens & Doyle, supra note 75, at 23.
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in this essay as the "newly democratizing" states, the "recovering" states
and the "recovered" states.77 These countries will continue to be stable if
they are able to carry out internal political and economic reforms. They
must also forge links with other African states as well as links with
international economic and humanitarian agencies. The kinds of threats
that these countries face would be outside the purview of the restruc-
tured Security Council that has been proposed elsewhere in this essay.
The second group will comprise the "failing" and "failed" states. To
the extent that the individual African states and the African regional
organizations lack the resources to deal with problems caused by these
national disintegrations, responsibility for their management will fall on
the Security Council. There is now general agreement that Article 39
provides a basis for unilateral humanitarian intervention by the United
Nations in cases where a state has disintegrated. Rwanda and Somalia
are the obvious examples. What is not clear, however, is the nature and
extent of United Nations responsibilities after the humanitarian objec-
tives have been achieved. How does the United Nations exercise its
peacebuilding functions and which internal factions does it negotiate
with when there are no acknowledged leaders, as was the case in Soma-
lia? State "failure" is not a Third World phenomenon. Former Yugosla-
via and the former Soviet Union are examples of States that have
"failed." After the end of the Second World War, Italy, Japan, and West
Germany were on the verge of "failing," a result averted only by the
Marshall Plan and political reorganization.
The Security Council can learn from these experiences as it faces
"failures" in Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia and possible
"failures" in Burundi, Sudan, and Zaire. In their essay Saving Failed
States, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner have proposed a number of
measures that warrant serious attention.7 Under their proposal, the
United Nations could set up a conservatorship in one of several forms.
Where the state was "failing" but had not yet "failed," it could be
provided with "governance assistance," meaning that the United Nations
would assist with institution-building or government reform but deci-
sionmaking authority would remain with the State. Such a plan is appro-
priate for Burundi, Sudan, and Zaire. Where the State has actually
"failed," some of its governmental authority would be delegated to the
United Nations. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), to which the Cambodian warring factions delegated authority
77. See supra Part I.
78. Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3
(1992-93).
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under the 1991 Paris Agreements,79 is successful precedent for this
system. Helman and Ratner also propose a total trusteeship in- extreme
cases. Under this proposal, a State that had completely "failed" would
be put under an international trusteeship similar to that outlined for
territories under Chapter XII.80 This arrangement would necessitate an
amendment of Article 78 of the Charter as all the existing "failed"
States are members of the United Nations and therefore not subject to
international trusteeship under Article 78. s' Under this proposal, the
Security Council could delegate actual management of the conservator-
ship to a subgroup dominated by regional members or the United Na-
tions Secretariat could be reorganized by creating a management facility
within it. These proposals have serious political implications that would
need to be taken into account. Care would have to be taken to ensure
that the United Nations was not devising a new form of colonialism.
Where feasible, clear timetables for ending the conservatorship, for
example, would have to be established.
CONCLUSION
The African continent is the most threatened of all the other conti-
nents. It will therefore become a testing ground as the international
community Irestructures its global peace management strategy. As long
as the African states fail to carry out significant domestic reforms, these
threats will persist. External factors such as arms exports to Africa and
unfavorable trade terms will exacerbate African insecurity. Failure by
the African states to establish an effective regional collective security
system has also contributed to this insecurity. The Central Organ of the
OAU for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, for example,
has failed to evolve into an African Security Council as had been hoped.
Its failure to take action in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia, for
example, and its decision to refer the Sudan situation to the United
Nations Security Council are clear indications that the African region
does not have an effective peace management structure. 2
79. Paris Conference on Cambodia: Agreements Elaborating the Framework for a
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81. Article 78 provides: "The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have
become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect
for the principle of sovereign equality." U.N. CHARTER art. 78.
82. See Horn of Africa: Strategic, and Shaky, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Jan. 5, 1996, at 1-3.
Winter 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
The United Nations Security Council will therefore continue to play
a significant role in African peace management. Several proposals have
been made in this essay:
1. If the United Nations is to play an effective role in African peace
management, the Security Council needs to be restructured in a manner
that enables it to carry out effective peace management operations.
2. Future peace management operations must be based on clear
mandates and clear grounds.
3. Future United Nations peace management operations must take
an integrated approach.
The United Nations cannot intervene in every conflict. The emer-
gence of "failed or "failing" states will necessitate interventions in
matters that traditionally would be considered within the domestic
competence of states under Article 2(7) of the Charter. These interven-
tions will involve various degrees of intrusiveness that will be dictated
by the nature of the threat presented. Specific timetables for withdrawal
should, where feasible, be devised before intervention takes place.
Where intervention fails to bring about "recovery" consideration should
be given to an extended international trusteeship or to some form of
merger with another state. 3
83. Helman & Ratner, supra note 78, at 19.
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